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In this paper we analyze market structure effects on wage in the Brazilian manufacturing 
sector between 1998 and 2005. Our comprehensive linked employer-employee data has 
observation at firm and worker data level, as market share, wages and skills. We also control 
potential endogeneity through a quasi-natural experiment. There are few empirical studies 
analyzing market structure effects on wages at firm level. As far we know it is the first study 
in this subject for Brazilian Industrial firms. 
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Resumo
Neste artigo analisamos os efeitos da estrutura de mercado sobre os salários na indústria 
brasileira de transformação entre 1988 e 2008. A ampla base de dados, com informações 
conectáveis empregado-empregador, tem observações por firma e por trabalhador. Entre 
elas, estrutura de mercado, salários e qualificação. Controlamos potencial endogeneidade 
através de experimento quase natural. Há poucos estudos analisando os efeitos da estrutura de 
mercado sobre salários por firma. Até onde sabemos, este é o primeiro estudo desta natureza 
para firmas brasileiras da indústria de transformação.
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i. introduction 
While the most common labor market models assume competitive product markets, 
non-competitive markets seem to be the norm in output markets (Nickel, 1999). Wage 
differentials between firms also suggest that a unique wage rate for all firms is not a 
good description of the labor market (Abowd et al., 1999). There are a number of mo-
dels that relate market power, in the form of excess profits, with wages, such as profit 
sharing and union bargaining (Brown and Medoff, 1989). Under imperfect substitution 
of worker types, firms with higher profits (reflecting market power) have incentives to 
attract more skilled workers as a cost saving device, increasing skill returns. But pro-
duct market high market share may generate monopsony labor market structure, with 
firms internalizing productivity differentials (Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2006).
There are few works that try to use matched employer-employee data to study compe-
tition effects on wages, particularly for Brazil. Menezes-Filho, Muendler and Reamey 
(2008) match workers and employers for a particular state in Brazil (São Paulo) using 
the same worker data set as we do, to analyze the structure of worker compensation in 
Brazil, with a comparison to France and the United States. Martins and Esteves (2006) 
use the same underlying data set we use, evaluating and rejecting profit sharing for 
Brazilian manufacturing but do not evaluate the effect of market structure on wages. 
In brief, there are several studies about wage differentials and matched worker and 
firm data, but not about the relationship between wages and market structure. There 
are a few but an important empirical literature about market structure and wages (e.g., 
Long and Link, 1983), but using sectorial data. And there are few studies analyzing 
market structure effects on wages at firm and worker level. In this paper, we analyze 
market structure effects on wage in the Brazilian manufacturing sector between 1998 
and 2005. Our larger sample has observation at firm and worker data level, as market 
share, wages and skills. As far we know it is the first study in this subject for Brazilian 
Industrial firms. 
We also control potential endogeneity through a quasi-natural experiment – better than 
instrumental variables, according to an important applied econometric literature. An 
exogenous source of market power variation (as the sharp exchange rate variation in 
2002-2003) is a way of correcting the potential simultaneity between wages and market 
share. This exchange rate change was induced by political risk from a presidential elec-
tion, with the exchange rate doubling within a year. Advancing the results, which, as 
far as we know, have not been found for Brazil and are some the few at firm and worker 
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level in the literature, we highlight that:  1) higher-skilled workers earns high and  2) 
the skill premium is accentuated by market share. Considering that the market share is 
also a way to measure firm size,1 this result also suggests that bigger Brazilian manu-
facturing firms pay highly skilled workers better wages than do smaller firms. After this 
introduction, we review the literature on this topic, explain our empirical specification, 
present the results and interpretations, and draw our conclusions. 
ii. related literature  
Wages differ in the market according to worker and firm characteristics. There seems to 
be high-wage workers and high-wage firms. A high-wage worker is someone who earns 
a greater gross income than is expected, considering observable characteristics such as 
experience, education, religion or gender. A firm that pays high wages is an employer 
that remunerates above mean wages, given the same observable characteristics of the 
worker (high-wage firm) (Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 1999). 
An important firm characteristic that may influence the high wage firms is market 
structure positioning and its market power. Theoretical investigations suggest a nega-
tive impact of monopolistic power on the labor market, much like a monopolist is able 
to capture consumer surplus. There is strong evidence that the division of monopoly 
revenues and high wages are positively correlated with market power. Nevertheless, it 
is not clear whether it happens due to the actions of unions, or whether this pattern also 
occurs in non unionized sectors (or with poorly active unions). However, the mecha-
nisms whereby competition in the product market impacts the labor market are clearer: 
the managers’ and workers’ effort and the decisions related to technological innovation 
(Nickel, 1999). 
Databases with linked employer-employee information permit substantial improvements 
in the analyses of labor market, as shown by the literature on the topic. Significant 
economic changes in the last 30 years, such as changes in international business pat-
terns, technological development and work restructuring, have irreversibly impacted 
labor, increasing the relevance of this kind of information. The full understanding 
of the impacts of these changes on income inequality, on employment and earnings 
depends on information that permits linking employees and employers (Haltiwanger 
et alli, 1998). 
1 Market share means is an old discussion. Here we consider two possible interpretations: market power and 
firm size. More details about it see Caves and Porter (1978) and Schmalensee (1989). 
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A review of about 100 studies for 15 countries conducted in the late 1990s confirms that 
the analysis of labor market based on data that connect information about employees 
and employers allows obtaining more precise estimates of the relation between wage 
and employment, as well as detecting their determinants (Abowd and Kramarz, 1999a). 
Among the advantages of econometric analysis, control for potentially endogenous fixed 
effects, and reduction of heterogeneity bias, which occur when information about spe-
cific firm or workers’ characteristics are absent from the database (Abowd and Kramarz, 
1999b). We follow this literature.
In fact, until recently, the empirical analyses involving heterogeneous earnings and 
firms were based on inappropriate databases to separately identify the individual effects 
necessary to classify a worker or firm as high-wage. Using a French database linking 
workers’ and employers’ information and controlling for observable and unobservable 
heterogeneity, Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) decomposed the total real annual 
income per worker into observable characteristics of the employer, and heterogeneity 
of individuals and firms. While the larger share of industry wage differentials and firm 
size effects are explained by worker effects, firm effects are significant. High-wage 
workers are the most productive but not the most profitable. Firms using high wage 
workers are also more capital-intensive, less likely to survive, and they are not the most 
intensive in highly qualified work (Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 1999). 
The effects of exchange rate shocks and competitive pressure on the labor market are 
significant since exchange rate fluctuation alters the relative prices of inputs and out-
puts. Competitive pressure induces firms to change their market strategies, and tech-
nological change modifies the demand for labor force. 
A recent study on the effect of competition, namely, foreign competition on wages is 
Guadalupe (2007) for British manufacturing. Empirical evidence, which was obtained 
through the use of a quasi-natural experiments2 (pound devaluation in 1996 particu-
larly) suggests that the skill returns in a given industry increase with competition; and 
exchange rate fluctuation increase skill returns not only for workers with intermediate 
educational level, but also for highly qualified ones. It should be underscored, at least, 
that union power is not important to set up wages in the Brazilian manufacturing sec-
tors (Lima and Resende, 2003), and there is no evidence in favor of rent sharing in those 
sectors as well (Martins and Steves, 2006). 
2 Alatas and Cameron (2008) recently also use quasi-natural experiment, but to analyze the impact of minimum 
wages on employment in Indonesia. 
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III. Empirical Specification 
In order to capture the relationship between wages and market structure, considering 
firm product market power and labor force skills, we estimate earnings models on 
unbalanced panels using fixed effects of firms and workers, and their interactions. Our 
base specification is as follows:
wikjt=β0+βXikjt+Ψi+ΦJ(i,t)+Γij+εikjt                                                                         (1)
where wikjt is the workers i=1,...,N wage with educational level k=1,...,3 in firm j=1,..,J 
at t=1,...,T; Xikjt is the matrix of (traditionally) observable characteristics of workers and 
firms; β0 is the intercept of the regression equation; β is the coefficient vector associ-
ated with workers’ and firm characteristics over time; Ψi is the vector of fixed effects 
of worker i; ΦJ(i,t) is the vector of fixed effects for firms j in which i workers were hired 
at t; Γij represents the interaction between Ψi and ΦJ(i,t), i.e, Γij= Ψi*ΦJ(i,t); and εikjt is the 
error term. 
This specification interact skill levels with firm characteristics. The linear specification 
for skills minimizes measurement error on the skill level and allowing for the strong 
diploma effects3 in Brazil. We interact firm and worker fixed effects to accommodate 
firm specific knowledge. 
In countries like Brazil with low average skill levels, and little or no apprentice 
schooling, worker technical skills are often provided by the firm. Brazilian Industrial 
Confederation (CNI, Confederação Nacional da Indústria) keeps a continuous worker 
training system (SENAI, Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial). It provides 
industrial worker skills upgrade, which change over time. It should be remarked because 
firm specific skills by worker are important to any theory of worker-firm wage differen-
tiation. In addition, we exploit exogenous variation in competitive pressure arising from 
relative price changes in the form of the 2002 sharp devaluation, interacted with firm 
characteristics. This type of analysis allow for heterogeneous responses by firm types 
to exchange rate changes. Given the possible interaction between high-wage workers 
and high-wage firms, a firm could have bigger market share just because it decided to 
spend more on its workers. It hired the most productive workers and this productivity 
was turned into more competitiveness (lower costs, better products, etc), allowing the 
firm to gain market share. The fixed effects capture this possibility. 
3 Diploma effects mean degree impact on wages. For example, a high school worker that gets an undergradu-
ate degree has a diploma effect on his wage. However, sometimes is not clear if wage premium is due to skills 
or more formal school years. Our regression controls it as we consider not only school levels but also age and 
tenure. 
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We could have endogeneity problem because market share can be determined simulta-
neously with wages, or be correlated with some omitted variable, such as technological 
change. As firms hire highly qualified workers, larger productivity associated with 
these workers help them gain market share; or as they gain market share, they need to 
hire more workers to keep their relative position, whose demand impacts on average 
wages. Before we go ahead, let’s review the debate between two possible endogeneity 
solutions:  instrumental variable and quasi-natural experiments. 
a. instrumental Variable versus Quasi-natural experiments 
Instrumental variables (IV) are a traditional and widely used possible solution to endo-
geneity. This approach essentially assumes that some components of nonexperimental 
data are random. That is, it is assumed that some variable or event satisfies the criterion 
of “randomness”- the event or variable is orthogonal to the unobservable and unallowa-
ble factors that could affect the outcomes under study.  However, IV has many weak-
nesses. For example, Buse (1992) gives the specific conditions to the potential bias of 
instrumental variable estimators, i.e., augmenting the set of instrumental variables will 
may increase the bias of the estimator and might also conclude that there is necessarily 
a trade-off between bias and efficiency. 
Bound, Jaeger, Baker (1995) point out problems with instrumental variables estimation 
when the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous explanatory variable 
is weak. They draw attention to two problems associated with the use of IV. First, the 
use of instruments that explain little of the variation in the endogenous explanatory 
variables can lead to large inconsistencies in the IV estimates even if only a weak 
relationship exists between the instruments and the error in the structural equation. 
Second, in finite samples, IV estimates are biased in the same direction as Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) estimates. In sum, their results illustrate that the use of instru-
ments that jointly explain little of the variation in the endogenous variable can do more 
harm than good.
Angrist and Krueger (2001) agree with Buse (1992) and Bound, Jaeger, Baker (1995). 
The most important potential problem is a weak instrument, that is, an instrument that 
is correlated with the omitted variables (or the error term in the structural equation of 
interest in the case of simultaneous equations). Another concern is the possibility of 
bias when instruments are only weakly correlated with the endogenous regressor(s). 
In fact, instrumental variables estimates with very weak instruments tend to be centered 
on the corresponding ordinary least squares estimate. An additional difficulty is inter-
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preting instrumental variables estimates. Not every observation’s behavior is affected 
by the instrument, so instrumental variables methods can be thought of as operating 
by using only part of the variation in an explanatory variable - that is, by changing 
the behavior of only some people. In other words, instrumental variables provide an 
estimate for a specific group-namely, people whose behavior can be manipulated by the 
instrument. Given the lack of credibility of many of the assumptions of standard instru-
mental variable studies, economists as well as researchers in other fields have sought out 
“natural experiments,” random treatments that have arisen as an important option. 
The advantage of the quasi-natural experiments (QNE) approach is that the assump-
tion of randomness for the instrumental variable (IV) employed is more credible than 
for those instruments used in almost all other studies (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000). 
In sum, applied econometric literature offers a second option to endogeneity problem: 
quasi-natural experiments. The use of QNE to evaluate treatment effects in the absence 
of truly experimental data has gained wide acceptance in empirical research in econom-
ics and other social sciences. Many researchers consider QNE better than IV as endo-
geneity solution nowadays. There are a larger literature about it and many applications, 
as Meyer (1995) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) surveys points out.4
We exploit exogenous variation in covariates from quasi-natural experiments. A quasi-
natural experiment, such as exchange rate overshooting for 2002-2003,5 creates exoge-
nous variation in explanatory firm variables that compensates for potential endogeneity, 
as different sectors were simultaneously affected in different time periods, exogenously 
altering intra-sectorial competition. Our exogenous variation in competitive pressures 
comes from exchange rate variation due to political risk in 2002 in Brazil. In this case, 
the ordinary least squares estimates are equivalent to difference-in-differences esti-
mates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).  
The difference-in-differences (DID) estimator is one of the most popular tools for ap-
plied research in economics to evaluate the effects of public interventions and other 
treatments of interest on some relevant outcome variables. DID estimator is based on 
an simple idea: simple comparisons of pre-treatment and post-treatment outcomes for 
individuals exposed to a treatment are likely to be contaminated by temporal trends in 
the outcome variable or by the effect of events, other than the treatment, that occurred 
between both periods. However, when only a fraction of the population is exposed to 
the treatment, an untreated comparison group can be used to identify temporal varia-
4 Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) remark potential standard errors inconsistency if DID is applied in 
presence of serial correlation. They also remark that computing standard errors that are robust to serial corre-
lation appears relatively easy to implement in most cases. Nowadays it is available in any standard econometric 
package. We consider it in our estimations.  
5 Law change is another popular source of exogeneity in QNE context. Besley and Case (2000) analyses when 
it is reasonable to treat differences in state laws as “natural experiments”. 
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tion in the outcome that is not due to treatment exposure.6 Now we can present our 
econometric specification. 
B. Econometric Specification
Our regression is as follows:
lnwikjt=α0+α1 TENijt +α2AGEit+α3DMit+α4DHit+ α5D02t+ α6D02DMit
+α7D02DHit +α8MSjt+ α9MSjtD02+ α10MSjtDMit +α11MSjtDHit+ α12 MSjt D02DMit 
+α13MSjtD02DHit + Ψi+ΦJ(i,t)+Γij + εikjt
Where lnwikjt is the (natural) log wage of worker wage. TENijt (tenure) is the number 
of months worker i worked at firm j up to t; AGEit is the age of worker i at t; DMit and 
DHit are dummies that indicate intermediate or high educational level, respectively, for 
worker i at t. Low educational level is the omitted category. Altogether, years of tenure, 
age and educational level sum up skills and capture the impact of observable worker’s 
characteristics on wages. 
MSjt is the market share of firm j at t, or the revenue of firm i in relation to the revenue 
of all firms in the sector in which it operates; MSjtDMit and MSjtDHit are the interactions 
between the firm market share and the skill dummies. 
D02 is the dummy for year 2002 (D02=1 for 2002 and zero otherwise) which captures 
the impact of exchange rate fluctuation on wages; D02DMit and D02DHit are the inte-
ractions between the dummy for 2002 and the intermediate and high educational level 
of worker i at t, respectively (which capture the effects of exchange rate fluctuation per 
educational level). 
MSjtD02 is the interaction of market share of firm j at t with the dummy for 2002 (which 
captures the effect of exchange rate fluctuation on market share), and MSjtD02DMit and 
MSjtD02DHit are the interactions of MSjtD02 with some intermediate and high educa-
tional levels (which capture the effects of exchange rate fluctuation on market share in 
each educational level).
In sum, this specification includes quasi-natural experiments (exchange rate overshoo-
ting) as alternative solution to endogeneity, has the aim to capture the effect of market 
share on wages, considering the qualification of workers in the Brazilian industrial 
6 For technical details, intuition, formalism and many examples about QNE and DID, please check Durlauf 
and Blume (2010), Angrist and Pischke (2009) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
(2)
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firms. As Cameron and Trivedi (2006) remark, natural or quasi-natural experiments 
naturally create treatment and control groups; and the main advantage of using data 
from a natural experiment is that a policy variable of interest might be validly treated 
as exogenous.  In our case, not all firms were affected by Real devaluation, especially 
in the same amount. So we have a treated and non treated group: intensive affected 
(treated) and not affected (non treated) by Real devaluation.7 
As a matter of fact, to verify whether higher competition in the product market alters 
wages due to workers’ qualification, it is necessary to consider not only the exogenous 
source of variation in the competition level in the product market (captured by the 
dummy for 2002 and interactions), but also unobservable heterogeneity and changes 
over time in sectoral composition and worker education change (through tradition school 
or SENAI courses). It is captured by the fixed effects of firms and workers. Implicitly, in 
the equation the econometrics is equivalent to a transformation that contains a differen-
tiating over time, i.e., we suggest an estimation of a linear panel data model with fixed 
effect that is, in practice, a more complex form of a difference-in-difference estimator. 
In fact, due to fixed effects, this is really difference-in-difference-in-difference approa-
ch, as we compare changes over time before 2002 with changes over time after 2002. 
Someone could say that with fixed effects we can’t identify the effects of time-constant 
variables; and that education change is associated with measurement error. But it is 
not true because industrial workers education in Brazilian industry is not constant. 
Industrial training system (SENAI) is available throughout the Country and provides 
continuous training to Brazilian industrial workers. In spite of formal education level 
change be hard and Brazilian workers normally do not back to traditional school system, 
effective industrial educations is provided and full accessible for industrial workers, 
specially to low and medium educational level. And high level workers attend to mana-
ge education (as MBA’s) time to time. So, there is effective change in education in the 
Brazilian industrial labor force and it can’t be consider measurement error. 
In summary, with this regression is possible to capture the impacts of competition on 
average wages (conditional to skills) in the Brazilian industrial firms.  
iV. data Base and Variables
Our data base are the Industrial Annual Survey (Pesquisa Industrial Anual, PIA) produ-
ced by Brazilian Census Office (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica, IBGE) 
7 We are not able to build detailed descriptive statics to illustrate treated and non treated firms because of 
census confidentiality.
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and Labor Annual Survey (Relação Annual de Informação Sociais, RAIS) produced 
by Ministry of Labor. PIA is a firm level industrial annual survey to Brazilian manu-
facturing. It began in 1966 and changed completely in 1996 to be according to modern 
survey technology.  It has been drawn according to concentration industrial. All in-
dustrial firms with more than 30 employees are in this survey. As smaller firms are the 
majority in number but the minority in economic activity, PIA has a sample to industrial 
firms with more than 5 and less than 30 employees. PIA allow us calculate at firm level 
market share as MSit= firm i at year t revenue/sector revenue at year t, where sector is 
SIC 4 digit disaggregation level.8 
All registered taxpaying establishments must send every year to the Ministry of Labor 
information about every single worker who had been employed by the establishment 
anytime during the reference year. The RAIS information provides a matched employer-
employee longitudinal data set, similar to those available in developed countries, co-
vering the formal labor market. The novelty differential of these data is to combine the 
matched employer-employee structure with detailed information available on workers’ 
occupation. The full data base is too large (about 25 million workers per year), with 
related computational difficulties. So we use samples. Those information allow us cal-
culate at firm level wages, age, tenure and schooling. 
PIA and RAIS are connectable through a common firm identification number. And 
workers have a permanent social identification number (PIS). We match 1998 to 2005 
editions, get a 10% workers random sample in the manufacturing sector and build a 
larger unbalanced panel with workers respectively personal and firm information. Table 
1 below gives details about our total and in each year worker sample. 
Table 1 - Industrial Workers Sample Details 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
No obs 230.133 241.006 251.708 241.553 274.628 277.664 321.413 322.510 2.160.615
V. results and interpretations
We start with descriptive statistics – which are fundamental to characterize the data-
base used, including information related to more than 2 million workers and more than 
18.000 firms between 1998 and 2005. Next, we present the results for the regressions 
8 This 4-digit follows CNAE classification, which follows international standards. We must use the most de-
segregated level as possible (in this data base it is 4-digit). On the contrary we could wrong calculate market 
share. See Sutton (1998). 
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detailed in the above section, and we finish by comparing the results obtained here with 
evidence for other countries. 
TABLES 2 and 3 inform the central tendency measures and dispersion for continuous 
variables used for the analysis, as well number of observations. Wage (W) average is 
6.89 minimum wages (MW)9 and the median is 3.74 MW, with standard deviation of 
10.07 MW.  According to the percentiles, 5% of workers earn less than 1.3 MW, 75% 
earn less than 7.37 MW and 5% earn more than 23.07 MW. That is, there is significant 
wage dispersion – confirming the well documented wage inequality and revealing po-
larization of earnings in Brazil – and most workers earn less than 4 MW. 
The educational levels used here are low (illiterate, incomplete 4th grade, complete 
4th grade and incomplete 8th grade), intermediate (complete 8th grade, incomplete 
and complete high school education), and high (incomplete and complete college edu-
cation). We choose compact education levels in those three classes because, according 
to Brazilian Ministry of Education, it is very difficult a Brazilian, specially working, 
change from one level to another. Effectively, a Brazilian worker has low probability 
to change from low education level to intermediate, and from intermediate to high. To 
compensate this traditional educational mobility rigidity, SENAI offers continuous 
technical training to Brazilian industrial workers in technical schools in the whole 
country. Education changes over time, indeed. 
Mean educational level (SCHOOL) corresponds to 1.78 while median educational level 
is 2, on a scale that ranges from 1(low) to 3 (high), with a standard deviation 0.65. Only 
5% of sampled workers are at the highest level. Mean tenure (TEN) is 60.59 months, 
and median TEN is 33.2 months, with substantial dispersion – and a standard deviation 
of 70.20 months. Only 5% of sampled workers had more than 18 years of tenure. The 
mean and median age is about 33 years, but 75% of sampled workers are younger than 
40 years old. In sum, the descriptive statistics suggest that most formal workers in the 
Brazilian manufacturing industry in our sample are young, have a low educational le-
vel, have few years of tenure and earn less than 4 MW.  Mean market share (MS, ratio 
between the revenue of firm j and the revenue of firms in the manufacturing sector 
where firm j operates) of about 18.000 sampled firms is around 12%, while median 
MS is 3.5%, with a standard deviation of 18%. Seventy-five percent of the sampled 
firms have a market share lower than 14%, and 5% have an MS greater than 52%, i.e. 
9As descriptive statistics show, most of workers income is below 4 minimum wages (MW), almost 75% of 
wages are below 7MW, close to 20% of wages are between 7 and 23 MW, and close to 5% are above 23 MW. 
We should use a price index as deflator according to each group income, i.e., at least 3 different deflator. It 
brings too much noise to regression, as each price index has a specific methodology. So, MW is the best option 
as deflator, as it at least doesn’t bring noise to regression. At least, Ministry of Labor official statistics reports 
wages series in MW because of it.
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in general, market share is low, with a high concentration restricted to a small group 
of sampled firms.  
Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables
Variable observations Mean Std deviation
W 2.160.615 6.89 10.07
SCHOOL 2.160.615 1.78 0.65
TEN 2.160.615 60.59 70.20
AGE 2.160.615 32.91 9.51
MS 18.560 0.12 0.18
Soure: Based on data from RAIS and PIA.
Table 3 - Percentiles of Continuous Variables
Variable P5 P25 P50 P75 P95
W 1.3 2.24 3.74 7.37 23.07
SCHOOL 1 1 2 2 3
TEN 2.3 11.5 33.2 82.5 214.4
AGE 20 25 32 39 50
MS 0.0009 0.008 0.035 0.14 0.52
Source: Based on data from RAIS and PIA.
To deal with causality, we follow an important applied econometrics literature and 
choose to include a quasi-natural experiment in the analysis – in this case, the ex-
change rate overshooting for 2002 to 2003 – in order to rule out potential endogeneity. 
According to Graph 1, the Real/U.S. dollar exchange rate between 2002 and 2003 
changed substantially – a fact that was attributed to electoral expectations in that pe-
riod.  Between January and May 2002, the R$/US$ exchange rate had a mean daily rate 
between R$2.3 and R$2.5. In June 2002, it rose to R$2.8; between July and August, 
it amounted to R$3.0, and in September, to R$3.9. From October 2002 onwards, the 
exchange rates started to go in the opposite direction. Between October and November 
2002, the US currency could be bought for R$3.60. Between December 2002 and March 
2003, the rate was around R$3.5; and between April and December 2003, it oscillated 
between R$2.8 and R$3.0. In brief, the R$/US$ rate for September 2002 was around 
70% higher than that for January 2002; and the rate for April 2003 was around 20% 
smaller than that for September 2002. The exchange rate fluctuation between 2002 and 
2003 has been attributed solely to political risk, as an untested left wing candidate was 
posed to win the election (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva).10 After it assured the nation that 
10 Real devaluation as electoral expectation was a surprise because: 1) Lula has had run and 
lost 3 presidential elections and 2) donation is a good proxy to market expectation. According to 
Brazilian Electoral Court (TSE), Lula’s Party (PT) won R$ 21 million in donations, while Jose 
Serra party (PSDB) won R$ 34 million in 2002 election, or 65% more than Lula’s party. It means 
that market expected Serra victory and Lula won 2002 presidential election was a great surprise. 
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the inflation targeting policy would continue and it actually raised the primary surplus 
in its first days in office, the exchange rate consolidated a descent.
Figure 1 - R$/US$ exchange rate
This can regarded as an exogenous shock. The definition of two periods – before and 
after the experiment, captured by the dummy for 2002, makes the ordinary least squares 
estimates equivalent to the difference-in-difference estimates of wage differentials, 
considering observable qualification indicators, especially educational level. Table 4 
sums up our specification, which includes quasi-natural experiments (exchange rate 
overshooting) as alternative solution to potential endogeneity, has the aim to capture 
the effect of market share on wages, considering the qualification of workers in the 
Brazilian manufacturing industry, avoid potential endogeneity. We see the majority 
of coefficients are significant but some of them very small, as tenure and age. Among 
skills proxies, school level has the strongest impact on wages. Market structure (MS) 
has negative impact on wages, but this effect change if conditional to schooling. MS 
effect in high school level also is bigger than in medium – in fact, far bigger. Exchange 
rate overshooting in 2002 effect on wage is negative on average, but it is not signifi-
cative for medium school level and it is positive to high. Market share interaction is 
also not significant (MS*D02), but it has positive effect if we consider school levels 
(MS*D02*DM, MS*D02*DH). We could say that workers with higher skills receive 
much higher wages than unskilled workers, as expected, and this differential increases 
with firm market share. Should we interpret market share as market power, firms with 
more market power pay higher wages for skilled workers and relatively lower wages for 
unskilled workers.The economic channel through which the Real devaluation handles 
the endogeneity problem is quite simple but not obvious. In 2002, the Real experienced 
devaluation. This can be seen as an exogenous shock that affected industries differ-
ently depending upon their openness to trade. The depreciation affected more deeply 
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industries that were relatively open before 2002. Its direct effect was to increase the 
prices that foreign competitors could offer in the Brazilian market and to decrease the 
number of potential foreign competitors who could sell in Brazil. Put differently, it 
increased the costs of foreign relative to Brazilian firms, which increased equilibrium 
prices proportionally to the extent of the increase in competition. 
Table 4 - Skills, 2002 Overshooting and Market Share 
Lnw
CONSTANT 5.56(0.07)***
TEN 0.005(0.000178)***
AGE -0.006(0.002)***
DMS 0.94(0.034)***
DHS 5.84(0.06)***
D02 -0.15(0.034)***
D02*DMS 0.013(0.045)
D02*DHS 0.32(0.07)***
MS -1.47(0.21)***
MS*D02 -0.19(0.23)
MS*DMS 0.53(0.17)***
MS*DHS 4.51(0.20)***
MS*D02*DMS -0.03(0.25)
MS*D02*DHS 1.48(0.28)***
FFE Yes
WFE Yes
FFE*WFE Yes 
R2 total 0.25
R2 within 0.05
R2 between 0.25
Test F for
All variables F(13,593.954)=2368.82***
MS*D02, MS*D02*DMS, MS*D02*DHS, D02*DMS,D02*DHS F(5,593.954) =54.46***
MS*D02,MS*D02*DMS, MS*D02*DHS F(3,593.954) =24.61***
D02*DMS,D02*DHS F(2,593.954) =11.76***
MS*DMS,MS*DHS F(2,593.954)=447.84***
observações 2.157.741
Source: Our own tabulation from Rais and PIA (1998 to 2005).
***,**,* means significance at 1%,5% and 10%, respectively.
Cluster robust standard errors between parentheses. 
lnw is worker i with schooling k at firm j in year  t ln wage; TEN is worker i tenure at firm 
j; AGE is worker i age in year t, DMS and DHS are medium and high schooling levels 
of worker i in the year t; D02 is 2002 dummy; D02*DMS and D02*DHS are year and 
schooling dummy interactions;  MS*DMS and MS*DHS are  MS and schooling dummies 
interactions; and MS*D02, MS*D02*DMS, MS*D02*DHS are market share and year and 
schooling dummies interactions. 
By comparing the results obtained here for Brazil with the evidence shown in the inter-
national literature, we noted that, regard to the U.S. case, the literature shows that the 
integration of product market may increase heterogeneity because opportunities are not 
uniformly distributed across groups (Andersen, 2005); and that between 1990 and 2000 
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there was polarization of the U.S. labor market between high - and low- wage workers, 
with a significant reduction in the participation of average-wage workers (Autor, Levy 
and Murnane, 2006). These results are also observed in Brazil, given the sign and 
significance of parameters for workers in each educational level. As a rule, the positive 
effects of exchange rate, foreign competition and market share are concentrated in 
workers with a high educational level, being a possible additional source of inequali-
ty.  Other pieces of evidence for the United States (Brown and Medoff, 1989) and for 
Australia (Waddoups, 2007) suggest a positive effect of firm size on wages. In Brazil, 
the positive effect of firm size (measured by market share) on wages is concentrated 
in workers with a high educational level.  For the United Kingdom, it was detected 
that the exchange rate fluctuation increases the returns to skill both for workers with 
intermediate and high qualification (Guadalupe, 2007). In Brazil, exchange rate has a 
positive effect only for workers with a higher qualification. 
Vi. concluding comments
This paper estimates the impact of market structure on wages in the Brazilian indus-
trial firms using a linked employer-employee dataset for 1998-2005. We control poten-
tial endogeneity problem through a quasi-natural experiment. Our main results are: 1) 
higher-skilled workers earns high; 2) the skill premium is accentuated by market share 
and 3) after 2002 currency devaluation, the skill premium is even higher in firms with 
larger market share. 
Considering that the market share is also a way to measure firm size, this result also 
suggests that the biggest Brazilian manufacturing firms pay highly skilled workers bet-
ter wages than do smaller firms. The results, to the best of our knowledge are new to 
Brazilian industry and some of the few in the literature at firm and worker level. From 
the standpoint of public policy formulation, the results obtained here indicate that it is 
fundamental to consider the effects of exchange rate fluctuation and market share im-
pacts on wages in the Brazilian industrial firms, since positive effects are concentrated 
in workers with higher qualification. The effects of formal education and firm size on 
wage determination are quite important as well. 
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